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Controls Over Atoms-For-Peace Under
Canadian Bilateral Agreements
With Other Nationst
STEPHEN GOROVE*

One of the challenging problems facing the modern world has
been the establishment of acceptable international control procedures
to assure that the formidable power of the atom will not be used for
the destruction of mankind but will serve exclusively peaceful
purposes.
Since the setting up of a world-wide authority with powers to
ensure nuclear disarmament in an ideologically and politically
divided world has met with endless impediments, many Western
policy-makers have focused their attention on efforts to ensure that
foreign nuclear assistance earmarked for peaceful purposes will not
be diverted to military use. They have hoped that this procedure
would not only be likely to slow down the tempo of proliferation of
nuclear arms but, at the same time, might also constitute a useful step
in the direction of a system of internationally executed nuclear arms
control or disarmament.
In establishing international (foreign) control procedures over
the peaceful uses of atomic energy, the major Western powers, led
by the United States, would have preferred the multilateral route
over the bilateral approach. However, shortly after the initiation of
President Eisenhower's Atoms-for-Peace program, it became obvious
that the establishment of the proposed International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) had a long way to go.' Thus the atomically advanced nations of the West decided to go ahead with the conclusion
of bilateral agreements incorporating provisions for safeguards to
ensure exclusively peaceful utilization of their atomic assistance to
other countries.
This article is the outgrowth of a study and on-the-spot survey
sponsored by the American Society of International Law involving
international procedures and techniques developed to control the
t
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peaceful uses of atomic energy. It discusses the control provisions
of Canadian bilateral agreements which are, in many ways, typical of
those concluded by Western nations.
The pattern of variables exhibited by the safeguards provisions
of the Canadian bilaterals may conveniently be analyzed in terms of
the objectives, methods, transfer, and sanctions of the control system.
Generally, the respective provisions bear strong similarity to many
bilateral agreements concluded by the United States and Great
Britain, respectively, with other nations. This is in no way surprising
since Washington, London, and Ottawa 'held several consultations to
bring their safeguards procedures into general harmony not only
among themselves but also with respect to the proposed control system of the IAEA in order to facilitate any future transfer of safeguards functions to that body.'
I.

OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF CONTROL

The over-all purpose of control under the Canadian bilaterals
is to assure exclusively peaceful uses or "nondiversion" to military
purpose (principle of "nondiversion") and, in line with this, to
prevent unauthorized transfer (principle of "nontransfer") .3
While there is no definition of the meaning of "peaceful" in
contradistinction to "military" uses, military utilization would naturally include use for atomic weapons. Under the Agreement of
December 11, 1957, with Germany, nondiversion is pledged by both
contracting parties4 and the same holds true under the terms of the
Agreement of December 6, 1963, with India.' But whereas under the
former the pledge extends to "identified materials"' (though not to
information or unidentified materials, equipment, and facilities)
supplied under the agreement,7 by terms of the latter it extends only
to fissionable materials produced in the respective power stations of
the two countries.'
The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of State have persistently
sought agreement from the other major powers supplying nuclear assistance to retain
and implement safeguards rights in their bilateral agreements in a way compatible
with the U.S. and IAEA systems. For details, see 3 McKinney and others Review of
the International Atomic Policies and Programs of the United States, REPORT TO THE
JOINT CoMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 851 (1960).
3 See, for instance, Agreements with: Australia, August 4, 1959 (391 U.N.T.S. 192),
Arts. 111(a), IV.1; Germany, Dec. 11, 1957 (Canada Treaty Ser. No. 29, 1957),
Arts. III.A, IV.A; Pakistan, May 14, 1959 (425 U.N.T.S. 130), Arts. III(a), IV.1.
4
Art. IV.l.
5
Art. IX (Canada Treaty Ser. No. 10, 1963).
6 "Identified material" means material (source material or special nuclear material or
fuel) supplied under the Agreement, or special nuclear material derived from the use
of such supplied material or produced in a nuclear reactor obtained pursuant to the
Agreement. See Agreement with Germany, Dec. 11, 1957, Art. VI(g).
2

7

Art. IV.1.

8 Art. IX.

CONTROLS

1965

OVER ATOMS

Under the agreement with Germany, the principle of nontransfer applies to both contracting parties and, in essence, signifies a ban
on transfer to international organizations, or to third governments
or to enterprises or individuals under the jurisdiction of third governments, unless the particular transfer is authorized.' Such authorization, however, is implied with respect to information, equipment
(other than nuclear reactors), facilities, and materials supplied under
the agreement, unless otherwise stipulated by the other party."0 With
respect to identified material after irradiation, there is no implied
authorization, and any transfer of such to a third party for chemical
processing or storage is subject to the prior written authorization of
the supplying party." While in the agreement with India nontransfer
is pledged by both parties, it covers only nuclear materials used or
produced in the nuclear power stations specified in the accord.' 2 The
Agreement of July 2, 1959, with Japan," indicates further variations.
By its terms, information obtained by either party may be transferred
to a third party, unless otherwise specified at or before the time of
supply. 4 The agreement further provides that, unless otherwise specified by the supplying party at or before the time of supply, materials,
equipment, and identified material may be transferred to governmental enterprises of the receiving party and to persons under its
jurisdiction subject, however, to the specific authorization by the
recipient party. Equipment, other than nuclear reactors and materials
obtained under the agreement, may be transferred beyond the jurisdiction of the recipient party unless otherwise specified by the supplier at or before the time of the initial delivery. Identified materials
and nuclear reactors, however, may not be transferred beyond the
jurisdiction of the recipient country without the prior consent of the
supplying party.'"
In addition to, and in line with, the major control objectives of
nondiversion and nontransfer, some Canadian bilaterals also purport
to accomplish certain lesser aims. For example, the agreement with
Japan assures the supplying party option to purchase, for use for
peaceful purposes only, any quantity of excess special nuclear material which has been derived from the use of identified material and
is not needed for use by the recipient party. In addition, the
agreement pledges consultation between the parties with respect to
9Art.
10 Art.
"Art.
12 Art.

I11(a).
II.3(a).
11.3 (b).
X.

13 383 U.N.T.S. 262.

14 Art. III(a).
15 Art. 111(b).
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precautions with which identified material is to be guarded. The
same bilateral also aims to ensure nonprocessing or nonalteration
in form or content of irradiated materials unless written authorization
has been given by the supplying party.' This is a very important
provision since it is normally after chemical processing or other
alteration that irradiated materials become most susceptible to
diversion.
II.

ROUTINE CONTROL METHODS

Most of the Canadian bilaterals, not including those concluded
with the United States and Great Britain, confer certain "safeguards
rights" on the supplying country (or countries if both are suppliers)
in order to enable such country to assure itself that the supplied
material or equipment, or source or special fissionable material
derived therefrom, is used solely for peaceful purposes.
The regular methods of control are most elaborate under comprehensive agreements involving substantial nuclear assistance where
the danger of diversion for military use is great. In such case, the
various types of safeguards include the right to examine the design
of equipment and facilities, to require appropriate record-keeping
and accounting procedures, as well as submission of reports, to
designate representatives who are to have access to all places and
data as necessary for material accountability and determination of
compliance with nondiversion, to approve the means to be used for
chemical processing, and to require notification regarding disposition
of nuclear materials.
The actual control functions are carried out by the designated
representatives of the Canadian government on the territory of the
assisted country or by other atomic energy personnel of Canada on
Canadian soil." If the bilateral agreement accords similar safeguards rights to a foreign country from which Canada receives
assistance, such safeguards rights are exercised in an identical fashion
by the designated representatives of the respective foreign country.
A. Examination of Design
Under the comprehensive bilaterals, the supplying country has
the right to examine the design of equipment and facilities, including
1-6Art. IIll(c) (d).
17 See,

for instance, Agreements with: Australia, Art. IV.1; Germany, Art. IV.I;
Pakistan, Art. IV.1.
18 The Canadian Atomic Energy Control Act of 1946 (10 George VI, Ch. 37) was
superseded by a later Act of 1952 (R.S.C. 1952, Ch. 11, as amended by 1953-4, Ch.
47) which established an Atomic Energy Control Board. Under Sec. 9(f) of the Act,
the Board is authorized, subject to the approval of the Governor in Council, to
make regulations "governing co-operation and the maintenance of contact, through
international organizations or otherwise, with scientists in other countries or with
other countries with respect to the production, use, application and control of, and
research and investigations with respect to, atomic energy."
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nuclear reactors, which are made available under the agreement or
in which any material supplied or any special nuclear material
derived from the use of such material or equipment is to be employed or processed. Such information is a "must" for the control
body if the supervision is to be exercised in a meaningful manner,
especially in connection with the evaluation or verification of records
(power charts, etc.) and reports. However, it should be emphasized
that the right of examination and subsequent approval relates only
to the question of assuring that the design will not further any
military purpose and that it will permit the effective application of
the provisions of the agreement.1"
The recent bilateral between Canada and India shows an interesting variation from the usual pattern as it is much more specific.
By the terms of that agreement, Canada pledges to provide the
necessary information and design, with detailed drawings and specifications, of a planned atomic power station in India, up to and
including the steam raising equipment. India, on the other hand,
undertakes to provide the design and detailed drawings of the part
of the station beyond the steam raising equipment, services, and
buildings." In addition, both countries pledge to exchange information on a continuing basis with regard to the design, construction,
operation, and use of their respective atomic power stations, research,
and development related thereto.2
B. Records and Reports
As a rule, under the comprehensive agreements the recipient
government pledges that an accurate record will be kept at all times
of the source and special nuclear materials derived from the use
of materials or equipment supplied pursuant to the agreement. In
addition, the recipient country agrees to make such records available
to the authorities of the supplying country and to submit periodic
reports based upon them. 2
Under the recent bilateral between Canada and India, both
governments agree to establish an adequate system of records to
ensure accountability for all fuel and fissionable material on the
premises of their respective nuclear power stations and to exchange
quarterly reports and special reports in the event of special circumstances at the request of either government, regarding the operation
19 See, for instance, Agreements with: Germany, Art. IV.1(a); Japan, Art. IV.I(a).
20 Arts. III and IV.
2] Art. VIII.
22 See, for example, Agreements with: Germany, Art. IV. I(b) and (c); Japan, Art.
IV.l(b) and (c).
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of their respective nuclear power stations. The reports are to
contain such details as may be reasonably requested by the recipient
country.2"
C. Inspection

One of the most crucial requisites of a meaningful control
system aiming to ensure the peaceful uses of atomic energy is on-thespot inspection. For this reason, the supplying country is given the
right to appoint representatives (inspectors) who are to have access
at all times to all places, equipment, and facilities where identified
material is used or located, to all data relating to such identified
material, and to all persons who, by reason of their occupation, deal
with such identified material or such data. The appointment of
representatives, however, may be made only after consultation with
the recipient government which clearly indicates a two-way process
rather than a unilateral imposition. The recipient state is normally
notified in advance of the proposed visit by the foreign inspectors
who are to be accompanied-

upon either party's request-by

representatives of the receiving country, provided that they are not
thereby delayed or otherwise impeded in the exercise of their
functions. The access is to be assured to the extent as may be necessary to account for all identified material and to determine whether
such identified material is being used for peaceful purposes only.2"
Normally, the inspectors carry out their control functions by verification and audit of records and reports, by comparisons, physical
and accounting checks, sampling, measurement, and through the use
of other devices and procedures that may be necessary for the accomplishment of the safeguards objectives.
Slightly more circumscribed stipulations may be found in the
earlier noted agreement between Canada and India which provides
that designated technical representatives of the two governments
are to maintain close contact and, whenever such representatives of
either government so request, they are to be accorded access to all
parts of the atomic power stations and to all other places where fuel
or fissionable material used in or produced by the station (or an
equivalent amount thereof) is being used, stored, or located. They
are also to have access to the appropriate persons and the relevant
data, including nuclear fuel records. Furthermore, they are entitled
to make such observations and measurements of fuel and fissionable
material as are relevant to the purposes of the agreement. How23

Arts. XII and XIV.
Agreements with:
Art. IV.1(e),

24 See,

Germany, Art. IV.1(e);

Japan, Art. IV.(d);

Pakistan,
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ever such observations and measurements are to be kept to the minimum consistent with the accomplishment of these purposes. "
D. Chemical Processing and Disposition
With respect to the already mentioned vital area of chemical
processing, most bilaterals provide that each party may satisfy itself
that the means to be used for such processing of identified material
after irradiation will not lend themselves to diversion to military
use.2 1 It may also be noted that the agreement with India provides
for advance notification regarding the disposition, after removal
from the respective nuclear power station, of any fuel and fissionable
material produced therein. 7
III.

TRANSFER OF CONTROL TO AN INTERNATIONAL AGENCY

Canadian bilaterals, much as their U.S. and U.K. counterparts,
envisaged the possible transfer of control rights and obligations to
the IAEA. Bilaterals which were entered into prior to the adoption
by the agency of its safeguards system required consultations between
the parties at or after the time the IAEA was in a position to carry
out its safeguards functions. The purpose of such consultations was
to determine whether, and to what extent, the governments wished
to modify the bilateral control stipulations so that they would conform more closely with the safeguards provisions of the IAEA and
to decide whether the parties wished to transfer the safeguards
functions to the agency."5
The recent agreement with India is less specific with respect to
transfer and provides only that the two governments will consult
with each other from time to time to determine in what respect and
to what extent they desire to "avail themselves of the services" of the
IAEA in reference to the bilateral.29
Although all the Canadian bilaterals have been concluded with
friendly nations, most of them carry provisions for certain sanctions.
For instance, under the agreement between Canada and Germany,
both parties have the right to apply sanctions in case it is determined
by either party that identified material is furthering a military
purpose. In such case the party making such determination has the
2

5

Art. XIII.

26 Agreements

with: Australia, Art. IV. (d); Germany, Art. IV.i (4); Japan, Art.

IV(c); Pakistan, Art. IV.f(d).
Art. XI.
28 See, for instance, Agreements with: Australia, Art. IV.2; Pakistan, Art. IV.2. It
may be noted that the IAEA, Japan and the United States signed an Agreement on
September 23, 1963 (14 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1265), providing for the application of
safeguards by the Agency to the bilateral accord between the two States. Similar
action may be taken in regard to the Canadian bilaterals.
29
Art. XV.
27
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right to suspend or cancel scheduled delivery of source material,
special nuclear material and fuel, and to require the return of all
identified material under the control of the other party.3" A slightly
smoother approach is taken by the agreement with Japan, which
provides that the party making the determination may, before exercising the right of suspension or cancellation and before demanding
return, call upon the other contracting party to take corrective steps.3
In the bilaterals, there is no machinery provided for arbitration
or judicial or any other settlement of a dispute arising out of noncompliance or otherwise. The bilateral with India goes even further
by omitting any reference to sanctions and stating simply that the
agreement reflects the "special relations and long standing cooperation" between the two countries in the peaceful uses of atomic
energy."
Finally, in order to protect the interests of the cooperating
nation and to allay possible fears regarding the disclosure of
technological know-how and industrial secret or other confidential
information, some bilaterals provide that representatives and other
officials under the jurisdiction of either contracting party, who, by
reason of their official duties, acquire such secret information, may
not disclose such information."
The penalty for unauthorized
disclosure in such case is determined by domestic law.
V.

CONCLUSION

The preceding safeguards procedures established by Canadian
bilateral agreements over the peaceful uses of atomic energy are
instructive inasmuch as they reveal a pattern of minimal requisites
thought to be essential for the application of effective control. 4
While all the safeguards represent, one way or another, some
burden and constitute an intrusion into domestic affairs, many of
them, especially the requirements for the maintenance of records
and the submission of reports, do not necessarily involve much extra
work, since they would normally be required by any efficient management as well as by the domestic control organs.
Undoubtedly, the most significant safeguard and the most crucial test of the ultimate effectiveness of the control system is on-site
30 Art. IV.3. For identical provisions, see also Agreements with: Australia, Art. IV.3;
Pakistan, Art. IV.3.
31

Art. IV.

32Art.

XVII.

33 See Agreements with: Germany, Art. IV.2; Japan, Art. IV.2.
34

On the meaning of "effective control," see McDoUGAL AND FELICIANO, LAW AND
MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 277 (1961).
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inspection. Limited as this is in regard to its over-all purpose and
application, it must nonetheless be viewed as a vital breakthrough
in the formerly "impregnable" wall of sovereignty.3 5 The lastmentioned fact, however, should in no way cause us to underestimate
national defense and security considerations which are likely to
continue to be the most powerful impediments in the way of an
extension of the "atoms-for-peace" inspection and control systems
to the all-important area of nuclear arms control and disarmament."
The ultimate value of the Canadian bilateral atomic control
program, like that of its U.S. and U.K. counterparts, lies not only in
the experience gained from its establishment and operation but also
in the fact that it has helped to make foreign supervision and on-thespot inspection on a reciprocal basis an accepted standard procedure
with respect to several countries. This surely seems to be a step in
the right direction.

35 See GOROVE, International Securtty Controls: From the Atom to Cosmic Space,
PRoc. 6TH COLL. ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 3 '(Paris, 1963).
36 GOROVE, Lessons From the Control of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in
Euratom. PROC. AM. SOC. INT'L LAW 136 at 139 (1964);
trols Over Atoms, N.Y. Times, March 22, 1964, Sec. E., p. 8.

cf. also GOROVE, Con-
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